June 2011

  • June 24, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Brandon L. Garrett, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. You can follow updates related to Garrett’s book, “Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong,” at the book’s Facebook page here.


    Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico ruled that it violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to permit a forensic report to be introduced at trial by putting on the stand a crime lab analyst who did not do the actual work in the case. The Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, reinforced the Court’s 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, by ruling that putting on such “surrogate testimony” denies the defense an opportunity for cross-examination. Some labs have long put on the stand forensic analysts who were not involved in the particular work done in a person’s case. Perhaps the analyst who actually did the work had left the office. Perhaps that analyst was overworked.  Or perhaps one analyst in the lab was especially effective in front of a jury.

    Donald Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated, after rear-ending another pick-up truck. The central evidence against him at trial was a lab report, a “Certificate of Analyst,” stating that his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. The prosecution did not call the analyst who actually tested Bullcoming’s blood sample – he had been placed on unpaid leave for some undisclosed reason. (This could raise a red flag – though perhaps the reason for the unpaid leave was entirely unremarkable.) The State instead called someone else from the lab who was familiar with their testing procedures.  

  • June 24, 2011

    The Senate confirmed Perkins Coie partner Michael H. Simon to the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon by a vote of 64 to 35. Simon was originally nominated by President Obama almost a year ago, and had been twice approved by the Judiciary Committee, but the Senate delayed a vote on his nomination despite the declaration of a judicial emergency in Oregon.

    During a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Judge Christopher F. Droney’s nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the nominee was “warmly received by Senators of both parties,” according to The Hartford Courant. The newspaper notes that Droney’s experience was “remarkably different” from that of President Obama’s two other nominees to this circuit. One, Robert Chatigny, was forced to withdraw his nomination after faced significant Republican opposition, and the other, Susan Carney, was confirmed “after several false starts.” The Judiciary Committee also held hearings on four district court nominees: Robert D. Mariani for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Cathy Bissoon for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Mark R. Hornak for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and Robert N. Scola, Jr. for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Committee again delayed a vote on former Kansas Attorney General Steve Six’s nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

  • June 24, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Elizabeth B. Wydra, Chief Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center. This analysis is cross posted at CAC’s Text & History blog.


    Two years ago in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court refused to allow federal food and drug law to displace state consumer-safety law.  Instead, the Court held that Diana Levine, a Vermont musician whose arm had to be amputated after Levine suffered adverse effects from Wyeth’s brand-name drug, Phenergan, could hold the drug manufacturer liable under state failure-to-warn laws—laws which hold drug and other manufacturers responsible for inadequate safety labels.  Yesterday, in a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court held in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing that generic drug manufacturers may not be sued under state failure-to-warn law because it would be “impossible” for the generic drug manufacturers to comply with both state failure-to-warn law and federal law.  Given the nearly identical storylines, how did the Supreme Court come up with a happy ending for consumers in Wyeth but a happy ending for big business in PLIVA?

    To be sure, there are important differences between the labeling laws for brand-name and generic drugs.  Federal law, for example, requires a generic drug to carry the same label as the brand-name drug it replicates.  But this “duty of sameness” for generic manufacturers is tempered by a duty under federal law to report problems with generic drugs.  So, while generic drug manufacturers cannot unilaterally change their labels, they can—and must—approach the FDA to seek to revise a drug’s label when they have reasonable evidence of a serious problem with the drug.  Such a label change would then go into effect for both brand-name and generic drugs. There is no guarantee, of course, that the FDA will act based on the information provided by the generic drug manufacturer, but the manufacturer’s attempt to achieve a safe and adequate warning label would nonetheless likely serve as a defense to state liability.  In other words, if the generic manufacturer did what it could under federal law, a state failure-to-warn claim should be preempted by federal law because it would be impossible for the manufacturer to comply with both federal and state law.

    But if a generic drug manufacturer doesn’t even try to comply with federal drug safety law and state failure-to-warn standards, it is difficult to see how it is “impossible” for the manufacturer to comply with both sets of laws.  As Justice Sotomayor explained in her PLIVA dissent, “because federal law affords generic manufacturers a mechanism for attempting to comply with their state-law duties to warn, . . . federal law does not categorically pre-empt state-law failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers.”  

    For the majority, led by Justice Thomas, to find impossibility preemption in this context is to twist the word “impossibility” beyond recognition.

  • June 24, 2011

    The Senate is set to move forward on several top Justice Department nominations that have languished for months, according to a floor update issued by Senate Democrats.

    The update states that at 10 a.m. on June 28, the Senate will proceed with debate on the nominations of James Cole for deputy attorney general, Virginia Seitz for assistant attorney general to head the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and Lisa Monaco to be assistant attorney general for national security.

    Cole has been serving as Deputy Attorney General for months via a temporary recess appointment. He was tapped by the president more than a year ago for the position. The Washington Post blasted the delay in confirming his nomination, calling it “ridiculous.” The Post editorial said Republicans were stalling the nomination because of Cole’s “condemnation of Bush-era anti-terrorism tactics.”

    Monaco, Cole’s deputy, and Seitz (pictured), a partner at Sidley Austin and frequent ACS participant, have been waiting for up-or-down votes on their nominations for months, “despite no public opposition to their confirmation,” The Blog of Legal Times reports.

  • June 24, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Ellen Dannin. Professor Dannin is the Fannie Weiss Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at Penn State Dickinson School of Law; and a former NLRB attorney. Professor Dannin is also author of the recent ACS Issue Brief,No Rights Without a Remedy: The Long Struggle for Effective National Labor Relations Act Remedies.”


    A recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) New York Regional Office, could pave the way for clearing up longstanding misunderstanding of graduate students’ rights to bargaining collectively with universities that employ them.

    That decision by Elbert F. Tellem, Acting Regional Director of NLRB Region 2, comes in a case involving the efforts of graduate students at New York University to unionize.

    In May 2010, GSOC/UAW Local 2110 filed a petition with the NLRB to represent New York University graduate student employees.  The union had already won a majority of votes tallied by the American Arbitration Association on April 26, but NYU refused to recognize the union.  On October 25, 2010, the Board, in a 2-1 decision, ordered the Regional Director for NLRB Region 2 (which has jurisdiction over boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx in New York City; and Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester counties) to hold a hearing on the employee status of the NYU graduate students.

    Most people incorrectly believe that graduate student employees have no right to union representation.  Take, for example, a July 23, 2004 Chronicle of Higher Education story on the NLRB’s 2004 decision concerning Brown University graduate students.  “Labor Board Rules Against TA Unions - Decision is major blow to organizing efforts at private colleges”:

    "Graduate students at private universities do not have the right to form labor unions, the National Labor Relations Board ruled last week, striking down its own landmark 2000 ruling that had led to a wave of organizing," The Chronicle story stated.

    The Chronicle had that impression, because that was the claim made by the majority in the 3-2 decision in Brown University – that graduate students at private universities have no right to union representation, because, said the Board majority, it is not possible to be both a graduate student and an employee of the university the graduate student attends.

    The problem is that the Board had no legal authority to issue such a broad decision. Here is why.

    First, the majority did not reach this conclusion after an analysis of the facts.  Rather, it said its decision was based on “policy,” and then extended that “policy” to all graduate students, regardless of the facts of their situation.

    The problem with making such a policy decision is that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not give the Board the power to make policy decisions in representation cases.  Rather, NLRA section 9(b) states that the NLRB must decide who is an employee eligible to vote on collective bargaining based on the facts “in each case.”  The case before the Board was not a case about the status of all graduate students everywhere.  It was solely about the Brown graduate student employees. 

    Furthermore, the law does not give the Board power to make a “policy” decision on this issue, because the law requires that such a decision be based on an analysis of the facts concerning the working conditions of the employees covered by the election petition.